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CSS/MM-92
26 January 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, CODIB

SUBJECT: Solution of the Biographic Intelligence Problem

1. A meaningful solution to the biographic intelligence problem pending in CODIB should satisfy three principal conditions:

- a. it should be practical,
- b. it should be effective in terms of enhancing biographic intelligence capabilities, and
- c. it should be fully acceptable to all activities concerned.

The prospects of achieving such a solution through CODIB are not encouraging because the lines of disagreement have been drawn too hard and are too divergent to permit accommodation in a single approach which is not enforced by strong management authority.


2. Following is a listing and analysis of some of the theoretically possible solutions:

a. Do Nothing.

This approach is neither practical nor effective because it ignores tangible improvements that are possible in the biographic intelligence area. The approach would be acceptable to some agencies, principally the FBI, but probably would draw severe criticism from the G&E Panel and the PFIAB.

b. Endorse and forward the Task Team V Final Report without change.

This approach is basically the same as doing nothing and, therefore, the comments above would apply. Approval of the subject report might be grossly unrealistic because the facts in the report are either incomplete or have been rendered inaccurate by the time which has passed since their preparation.



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c. Endorse and forward the CODIB cover report to the Task Team V Report.

The practicality and effectiveness of the actions recommended in the CODIB cover report cannot be accurately determined because elaborating and supporting facts have not been added to the basic Task Team V report. The proposed actions aren't acceptable to all the participants in the biographic intelligence problem, notably the FBI and CIA. Any attempt to force adoption of the recommendations of the CODIB cover report might result in damage to the working relationships between agencies now engaged in biographic intelligence activities.

d. Initiate a new study of the biographic intelligence problem.

This is a practical approach in terms of providing current, comprehensive facts on which to base a judgment and resolve some of the claims and counter-claims concerning the need for improvement in the current systems and the magnitude and cost of effort required to achieve improvements. The approach is politically impractical for the counterintelligence/security aspects of the problem because of the strong positions already taken by some agencies. The approach might be both practical and acceptable only if the positive intelligence facet of the problem is selected for concentration; it could be effective in terms of its contribution to understanding of existing positive intelligence biographic systems and their potential for improvement.

e. Delay action until the GSE Panel has reported its findings.

This approach has the disadvantage of denying the initiative to the intelligence community. Assuming that the report will be fairly strong in its recommendations regarding the biographic intelligence problem, this approach has the advantage of bringing directive authority to bear on an improvement program. Some agencies would probably approve this approach.

f. Report to USIB on individual agency projects in biographics.

This approach is basically the same as doing nothing or delaying action until the GSE Panel report is received; it can't be viewed as a serious attempt at positive action. Such a report could even produce an adverse image of the community and its ability to cope with recognized problems.


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3. For purposes of this paper, approach 2d (initiate a new study of the biographic intelligence problem) has been selected and expanded into a brief outline of specific actions to be undertaken. This approach was selected because it represents the most positive action CODIB could take.

4. In the final analysis, CODIB may have no reasonable choice but to await the report of the G&E Panel. It doesn't appear that there will be sufficient time to prepare and staff any type of positive action before the report is published. CODIB should be very wary of any action which would damage the community's image or compound an already difficult situation. During the waiting period, CODIB might be able to use the time to good advantage to start collecting some of the information that might be required for an intelligence response to the G&E Panel report and a start on implementing its recommendations in the biographic intelligence area.


Chief, CODIB Support Staff

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